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0xF1RTYB00B5.
Sep 06, 2025
Экспертные Вопросы и Ответы

Smart Contract Security Patterns in Move

I'm facing security implementation challenges in my DeFi protocol. Here's my specific challenge:

resource struct Asset {
    value: u64,
    metadata: Metadata,
}

fun transfer(
    sender: signer,
    recipient: address,
    amount: u64
): bool {
    let sender_account = borrow_global_mut<Asset>(sender.address());
    let asset = move_from(&mut sender_account, amount);
    transfer::transfer(asset, recipient);
    true
}

Could someone suggest a secure implementation pattern that prevents reentrancy attacks and unauthorized transfers while maintaining Move's resource guarantees?

  • Move CLI
  • Move
  • Smart Contract
  • Move Module
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Ответы

2
Michael Ace.
Sep 7 2025, 11:38

As a Move developer specializing in DeFi protocols, I'll show you how to implement secure transfer functionality that prevents reentrancy attacks while maintaining Move's resource guarantees. Here's my approach:

Core Security Patterns

When implementing secure transfers in Move, I focus on three essential components:

  1. State Management
  • Atomic operations for state updates
  • Proper locking mechanisms
  • Version tracking for state changes
  1. Access Control
  • Strict permission verification
  • Capability-based access
  • Resource ownership validation
  1. Transfer Validation
  • Balance verification
  • Amount validation
  • Recipient authentication

Implementation

resource struct Asset {
    value: u64,
    metadata: Metadata,
    version: u64,
    locked: bool,
}

fun transfer(
    sender: signer,
    recipient: address,
    amount: u64
): bool {
    // 1. Validate inputs
    assert!(amount > 0, 1);
    assert!(recipient != address::zero(), 2);
    
    // 2. Lock account to prevent reentrancy
    let sender_account = borrow_global_mut<Asset>(sender.address());
    assert!(!sender_account.locked, 3);
    sender_account.locked = true;
    
    // 3. Validate state
    assert!(sender_account.value >= amount, 4);
    assert!(sender_account.version == get_current_version(), 5);
    
    // 4. Perform transfer
    let asset = move_from(&mut sender_account, amount);
    transfer::transfer(asset, recipient);
    
    // 5. Update state
    sender_account.value -= amount;
    sender_account.version += 1;
    sender_account.locked = false;
    
    true
}

Security Features

  1. Reentrancy Prevention
  • Account locking mechanism
  • Version tracking
  • Atomic state updates
  1. Access Control
  • Input validation
  • Balance verification
  • Permission checks
  1. State Management
  • Atomic operations
  • Version tracking
  • Proper state updates

This implementation provides a secure foundation for asset transfers while maintaining Move's resource guarantees. The pattern prevents reentrancy attacks through account locking and version tracking, while ensuring proper state management and access control.

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Big Mike.
Oct 2 2025, 22:26

Lemme provide a comprehensive guide to building secure DeFi protocols on the Sui blockchain.

Core Security Implementation

I implement my DeFi protocols with multiple security layers to prevent common attacks:

resource struct Asset {
    value: u64,
    metadata: Metadata,
    nonce: u64,           // Prevents replay attacks
    locked_until: u64,    // Prevents reentrancy
    allowances: map,      // For authorized transfers
}

fun transfer(
    sender: signer,
    recipient: address,
    amount: u64
): bool {
    // Security checks
    assert!(sender.address() != recipient, 1);
    assert!(amount > 0, 2);
    
    let sender_account = borrow_global_mut<Asset>(sender.address());
    
    // Reentrancy protection
    assert!(
        current_timestamp() >= sender_account.locked_until,
        3
    );
    
    // Lock account temporarily
    sender_account.locked_until = current_timestamp() + 1;
    
    // Transfer logic
    let asset = move_from(&mut sender_account, amount);
    transfer::transfer(asset, recipient);
    
    true
}
flowchart TD
    classDef core fill:#FF9999,stroke:#CC0000,color:#000
    classDef parallel fill:#99FF99,stroke:#00CC00,color:#000
    classDef storage fill:#9999FF,stroke:#0000CC,color:#000
    classDef oracle fill:#FFFF99,stroke:#CCCC00,color:#000

    subgraph Core["Core Components"]
        Pool["Pool Manager"]:::core
        PTB["Programmable Transaction Blocks"]:::core
    end

    subgraph Parallel["Parallel Execution Layer"]
        PE["Execution Engine"]:::parallel
        MEV["MEV Protection"]:::parallel
        DAG["DAG-based Consensus"]:::parallel
    end

    subgraph Storage["Object Storage"]
        Assets["Asset Objects"]:::storage
        LP["LP Tokens"]:::storage
        Metadata["Pool Metadata"]:::storage
    end

    subgraph Oracle["Price Feeds"]
        PO["Price Oracles"]:::oracle
        Cache["Price Cache"]:::oracle
    end

    Pool --> PTB
    PTB --> PE
    PE --> MEV
    PE --> DAG
    
    Pool --> Assets
    Pool --> LP
    Pool --> Metadata
    
    Assets <--> PO
    PO --> Cache

    %% Legend
    subgraph Legend["Legend"]
        C1["Core Components"]:::core
        P1["Parallel Processing"]:::parallel
        S1["Storage Layer"]:::storage
        O1["Oracle System"]:::oracle
    end

The diagram above illustrates the system architecture, where:

  • Red components represent core system elements handling transfer operations
  • Green sections show the parallel processing infrastructure
  • Blue represents object storage for assets and metadata
  • Yellow indicates external price feed integration

Security Implementation Details

  1. Reentrancy Protection```move fun transfer( sender: signer, recipient: address, amount: u64 ): bool { // Check if account is locked let sender_account = borrow_global_mut(sender.address()); assert!( current_timestamp() >= sender_account.locked_until, 3 );

    // Lock account for duration of transaction sender_account.locked_until = current_timestamp() + 1;

    // Perform transfer let asset = move_from(&mut sender_account, amount); transfer::transfer(asset, recipient);

    true }



2. **Authorization Control**```move
fun transfer_with_allowance(
    sender: signer,
    recipient: address,
    amount: u64,
    allowance: u64
): bool {
    let sender_account = borrow_global_mut<Asset>(sender.address());
    
    // Check allowance
    assert!(
        sender_account.allowances.get(&recipient).unwrap_or(0) >= amount,
        4
    );
    
    // Update allowance
    sender_account.allowances.insert(
        recipient,
        allowance - amount
    );
    
    // Perform transfer
    let asset = move_from(&mut sender_account, amount);
    transfer::transfer(asset, recipient);
    
    true
}

Security Best Practices

  1. Resource Safety
  • Use Move's resource types for asset management
  • Implement proper access control
  • Maintain resource immutability where possible
  • Use formal verification for critical functions
  1. Transaction Security
  • Implement reentrancy protection
  • Use nonces for replay protection
  • Validate all inputs
  • Implement proper error handling
  1. State Management
  • Maintain consistent state updates
  • Use atomic operations
  • Implement proper locking mechanisms
  • Validate state transitions

Testing Strategy

#[test]
fun test_transfer_security() {
    let scenario = test_scenario::builder().build();
    let sender = scenario.address(0);
    let recipient = scenario.address(1);
    
    // Test reentrancy protection
    assert!(
        !transfer(
            &mut scenario.ctx,
            sender,
            recipient,
            100
        ),
        "Should fail due to locked account"
    );
    
    // Test authorization
    assert!(
        !transfer_with_allowance(
            &mut scenario.ctx,
            sender,
            recipient,
            100,
            50
        ),
        "Should fail due to insufficient allowance"
    );
}

Common Security Pitfalls to Avoid

  1. Reentrancy Vulnerabilities
  • Not implementing proper locking mechanisms
  • Allowing external calls before state updates
  • Not using the checks-effects-interactions pattern
  1. Authorization Issues
  • Not validating sender permissions
  • Not implementing proper allowance management
  • Missing input validation
  1. State Management
  • Not maintaining consistent state
  • Not implementing proper locking mechanisms
  • Missing state validation

Always thoroughly test your implementation before deployment, and consider using formal verification tools to prove the correctness of your critical functions.

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